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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, law schools and business schools across the United States
have witnessed a growing interest in teaching and research related to the reso-
lution of disputes. A large number of law schools currently offer courses in
alternative dispute resolution, arbitration, negotiation, interviewing, and coun-
seling.1 Indeed, there appears to be "a new profession being born-the lawyer
mediator .... More [young lawyers] are seeking an alternative to the adver-
* The author wishes to thank the National Institute for Dispute Resolution and
The University of Michigan School of Business Administration for supporting this
work.
** Professor of Business Law, The University of Michigan School of Business Ad-
ministration; B.A., College of Wooster, 1967; J.D., The University of Michigan Law
School, 1970; Diploma in Comparative Legal Studies, Cambridge University, 1971.
1. Courses, clinics or other dispute resolution programs are offered at 108 law
schools. Ray, Kestner, & Freedman, Dispute Resolution: From Examination to Exper-
imentation, 65 MICH. B.J 898, 899 (1986). Nearly 75% of the 400 professors who
responded to a survey by the Dispute Resolution Clearinghouse at the University of
Wisconsin indicated that they teach alternative dispute resolution in some form.
Surveys Show ADR a Staple of Curricula, ALTERNATIVES, Oct. 1985, at 7.
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sary system and are open to alternatives such as mediation."'
Interest in dispute resolution among business school professors is evi-
denced by an increase in the number of research papers and courses on dispute
resolution.3 The number of papers presented at the annual meeting of the
Academy of Management on Power, Negotiation and Dispute Resolution grew
fourfold over six years, from six papers in 1980 to twenty-four in 1985.' Like-
wise, only a few courses on these topics were in existence in 1980, while today
approximately fifty courses are offered.' At some schools, these courses are
among the most popular offerings with students.'
In some respects, the law school and business school approaches to dis-
pute resolution are similar. The principles of negotiation, for instance, are
taught in both types of school.' And the prospect of future cooperation be-
2. 1983 LAW SCHOOL DIRECTORY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS iii (K.
Brannelly ed. 1983). The first law school textbook was published in 1985. S.
GOLDBERG. E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985). This textbook was
followed by a casebook in 1986. L. KANOWITZ, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(1986).
3. See ADR Blossoms in Business Schools, ALTERNATIVES, Oct. 1985, at 11.
Like law schools, business schools across the country report that the bur-
geoning interest in dispute resolution has surfaced in a plethora of courses
dealing with the subject. The trend has been spearheaded by a class of busi-
ness professors keenly aware of the advantages of short-of-court solutions to
business problems.
id.
4. Academy of Management Proposal for the Formation of a Power/Negotia-
tion/Conflict Resolution Interest Group 2 (January, 1986) (unpublished document)
[hereinafter Academy of Management Proposal).
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id. At the Amos Tuck School of Business Administration at Dartmouth, for
example, the Executive Power and Negotiation course is the most popular course in the
school. When the course was first offered, twenty percent of the student population
enrolled; the percentage today stands at ninety percent.
"I teach people to stay out of court," says Prof. Leonard Greenhalgh of the
Amos Tuck School of Business Administration at Dartmouth. "Almost all
business situations have the potential for conflict, so the question is: How to
deal with it?" he reasons. "Litigation is only one way, and it is often heavy-
handed and not productive."
The importance of dispute resolution (DR) for business is much on the
minds of business students as well, Professor Greenhalgh maintains. While
"business is certainly becoming dissatisfied with litigation," he says, "the
pressure for curricular treatment of the topic often comes from the students
themselves."
ADR Blossoms, supra note 3, at 11.
7. See, e.g., S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 19-89; L.
KANOWITZ, supra note 2, at 39-76; and R. LEWICKI & J. LITTERER. NEGOTIATION
(1985). However, to date, it appears that most of the literature on negotiation has been
written by law professors or practicing attorneys. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another
[Vol. 1988
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tween law schools and business schools is promising; as a result of the efforts
of the Center for Public Resources, the American Arbitration Association, and
the National Institute for Dispute Resolution. The Center for Public Re-
sources has established an Education Project designed to promote curricular
development, research, and interdisciplinary work.s In 1983, the American Ar-
bitration Association invited representatives of leading law and business
schools to meetings to discuss dispute resolution teaching and research.' These
meetings led to the formation of a Task Force on Law and Business Schools
which examined, among other issues, business school and law school coopera-
tion." The National Institute for Dispute Resolution (NIDR) has established
programs to support dispute resolution teaching and research in business
schools and law schools." And in 1985 and 1986, the Task Force and NIDR
sponsored conferences on teaching negotiation and mediation attended by law
and business school professors.'"
Despite certain similarities and future prospects, however, fundamental
differences exist between law school and business school approaches to dispute
resolution. In law school, dispute resolution is often referred to as
ADR-alternative dispute resolution. The focus is on disputes in which litiga-
tion is on the horizon,1 s and negotiating processes take place within the
View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754,
755 n.1 (1984).
8. Groups Increase Aid to ADR Professors, ALTERNATIVES, Oct. 1985, at 12.
The Center for Public Resources has developed an alternative dispute resolution pledge
that has been signed by the chief executive officers of almost one hundred American
corporations. See J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO RESOLVING
LEGAL DISPUTES 127-28, 154-56 (1985).
9. The business school meeting was hosted by Walter Wriston, then chairman of
Citibank. Michael I. Sovern, President of Columbia University, chaired the law school
meeting.
10. The Task Force focused its efforts in three areas: research, teaching, and the
developing of workshops. Reports of the AAA Task Force on Law and Business
Schools, ARB. J., Sept. 1985, at 17.
11. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PROGRAM ON PROFES-
SIONAL EDUCATION: GRANTS ANNOUNCEMENT AND PROGRESS REPORT (1986).
12. The 1985 conference was attended by 120 law and business school professors.
ADR Blossoms, supra note 3, at 11.
13. A dispute, for purposes of legal research, exists when a claim based on a
grievance is rejected by the other party. Miller & Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Dis-
putes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 L. & Soc'y REV. 525, 527 (1980-81);
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA
L. REv. 4, 13 (1983); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of
Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 73, 87 (1983). Some researchers, however,
define a dispute as a conflict which is made public. See, e.g., Mather & Yngvesson,
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shadow of the law."' The law school approach views the attorney as a key
player in the dispute resolution process; in other words, "lawyers serve as the
gatekeepers for disputes." 1'
Business school professors tend to adopt a broader perspective than their
law school counterparts by emphasizing conflict, which is viewed as an ubiqui-
tous phenomenon that exists at all levels of an organization.' Dispute resolu-
tion is not necessarily seen as an alternative to litigation because legal resolu-
tion of the conflicts with which business school professors are concerned may
not be feasible.17 As a result, the role of the attorney is diminished in the
business school approach 1' and replaced to some extent by an interest in power
theory" and conflict intervention."
The relationship between law school and business school approaches to
dispute resolution has not, to date, been clearly articulated and discussed. This
is unfortunate because increased awareness of the differences in perspective
would enrich dispute resolution theory and practice. The purpose of this paper
is twofold. First, a dispute resolution taxonomy will be used to provide an over-
view of the linkage between law school-type ADR concepts and the business
school interest in power theory and conflict intervention. Second, to illustrate
the benefits that can arise from interaction between legal and business re-
search, a specific technique--the use of decision tree analysis in resolving dis-
putes-will be explored in depth.
II. DISPUTE RESOLUTION: AN OVERVIEW
This section will provide an overview of the relationship between alterna-
tive dispute resolution as taught in law schools and the business school con-
cepts of power theory and conflict intervention. The framework for comparison
will be a three-part dispute resolution taxonomy: dispute prevention, alterna-
tive dispute resolution, and dispute management."
The sequence in which these categories are discussed represents to some
extent the strategies used in dealing with disputes, presented in chronological
order. Initially, the focus should be on preventing disputes. In cases where
prevention fails, the emphasis moves to the methods of dispute resolution that
serve as alternatives to litigation. If the alternatives fail, management of the
14. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
15. U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR PUBLIC PoLIcv IssuS OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 20 (1984).
16. Academy of Management Proposal, supra note 4, at 1.
17. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 55 on an employee's use of power.
18. See J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 78.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 40-56.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 110-20.
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dispute becomes the main concern.
A. Dispute Prevention
1. The Law School Approach: Preventive Law
In law schools, dispute prevention comes in the guise of preventive law.
The fundamental premise of preventive law is that it is often more important
to predict how people will behave than what a court will do.'$ In other words,
winning a lawsuit can result in financial disaster, while preventing a lawsuit
can be less expensive." Dispute prevention includes five approaches which
might be combined or used separately: (1) consensus building, (2) dispute
analysis, (3) legal audits, (4) legal education of management, and (5) the use
of an ombudsman.
Consensus building is useful in reducing the sense of injury felt by an
aggrieved party and, in turn, the potential for resulting litigation. It is felt that
those who participate in reaching a consensus are less likely to feel injured.,,
The consensus-building model has been especially successful in the environ-
mental area-for example, in the National Coal Policy Project,1° and in nego-
tiated development of land use projects.26
Dispute analysis involves the tracking of disputes in order to determine
where and how they arise and the costs incurred in their resolution.27 The law
department of Bank of America, for instance, uses a preventive law log to
track attorneys' suggestions to management.'8 Bank of America also estab-
lished a Task Force which recommended a dispute resolution program that, in
conjunction with the tracking of disputes, included a number of preventive
measures such as consumer education, employee training, and a streamlined
complaint process."
A legal audit-an audit of a company's legal affairs-might include the
development of a statistical base to determine the areas in which the company
is most susceptible to litigation.'0 However, audits are also used to prevent
disputes that are less obvious' and to establish procedures which better enable
a company to defend a lawsuit. A litigation audit, for instance, might provide
a process and a checklist for educating management with regard to discovery
procedures, privileged communication, security matters, procedures for han-
22. L. BROWN & E. DAUER, PLANNING BY LAWYERS 309 (1978).,
23. CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, supra note 21, at xxviii-xxix.
24. Id. at xxix.
25. Id. at 125-37.
26. Id. at 171-210.
27. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 102.
28. Id. at 105.
29. CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, supra note 21, at 211-18.
30. J. HENRY & J LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 104.
31. L. BROWN & E. DAUER, supra note 22, at 335-58.
1988]
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dling documents, and steps to follow once litigation arises."
Legal education of management could possibly be accomplished by means
of a legal audit but should be viewed as a broader company responsibility that
exists whether or not an audit procedure is in place. For example, the most
advanced compliance effort a company might make in response to the threat
of federal antitrust action is to integrate compliance with normal management
functions. This benefits individual managers as well as the company.
Managers understand that they will enhance profitability and that their pro-
fessional advancement requires an understanding of the law, the enforcement
environment, and the complexity of promotion compliance among subordi-
nates. Senior managers spend more time than they have spent in the past on
legal matters. Several companies claim to keep a "Friends of Legal" list,
which, in addition to being a resource for the legal department, helps discrim-
inate among candidates for promotion."
An ombudsman is essentially a neutral fact-finder who has been author-
ized to investigate complaints and make recommendations." With the demise
of the employment-at-will doctrine," the use of an ombudsman has become
especially valuable in preventing litigation resulting from employee com-
plaints. At McDonald's Corporation, for instance, the ombudsman handles be-
tween 150 to 180 employee complaints a year."
These five preventive law approaches are given short shrift in law school
textbooks on dispute resolution. The use of an ombudsman receives the most
coverage;"3 other preventive law methods such as the legal audit receive very
little attention."
2. The Business School Approach: Power Theory
Dispute prevention in business schools falls within coverage of power the-
32. Gonser & Wilhelm, The Litigation Audit, 68 A.B.A. J. 446 (1982).
33. Beckenstein, Gable & Roberts, An Executive's Guide to Antitrust Compli-
ance, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 101.
34. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 109.
35. See Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARe. L. REV. 1816 (1980); Lopatka, The
Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law
Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAW. 1 (1984).
36. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 110. For a description of the role
of the ombudsman at Control Data Corporation, see CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES,
supra note 21, at 229-41. If the ombudsman is unable to resolve a dispute, the mini-
trial might be used as an alternative to litigation. Id. at 243-47. Mini-trials are dis-
cussed infra at text accompanying notes 81-96.
37. See, e.g., L. KANOWITZ, supra note 2, at 135-46; S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN. &
F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 298-300.
38. See, e.g., S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 548-49.
[Vol. 1988
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ory. Power theory receives little coverage in law school textbooks,8 ' while in
business schools, the role of power appears to be covered more extensively.40
Power is broadly defined as the ability of people to bring about certain
outcomes."1 The concept of power involves "the notion of getting someone to
do something that he or she would not do in the absence of influence.' 4 Un-
derlying most models of power are five power bases originally articulated by
French and Raven:' s
a. Legitimate power arises in situations in which one person feels that it is
proper to obey the directions of another person.44 For example, a subordinate




b. Referent power arises when a person is attracted to or admires a
powerholder" or a reference group.4'7 A partner, for instance, might persuade
a newly-hired associate to work evenings by noting that all partners worked
evenings when they first became associated with the firm.
c. Expert power exists when the powerholder has developed expertise in a
particular area," although the power might extend beyond the area of exper-
tise.' A person who has developed an expertise in finance or marketing, for
instance, might be able to exert power within an organization beyond these
functional areas.
d. Punishment power involves punishment of a person (e.g., dismissal or a pay
cut) who does not comply with a request." One problem with punishment
power is that it requires surveillance by the powerholder to determine whether
punishment is justified.' 1
e. Reward power is the reverse of punishment power in that rewards are given
39. In L. KANOWITZ, supra note 2, at 41-68, a section on "Power Versus Rea-
son" contains for the most part a case, NLRB v. Ins. Agent's Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477
(1960), and readings on missiles, deterrents, and United States-Soviet Union negotia-
tions. In addition, S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 29-33,
contains an excerpt from Fisher, Negotiating Power, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 149, 150,
160-64 (1983), in which Fisher acknowledges that "GETTING TO YES has been justly
criticized as devoting insufficient attention to the issue of power."
40. See R. LEWICKI & J. LITTERER, supra note 7, at 239-57. The word "power"
even appears in course titles. See, e.g., supra note 6.
41. R. LEWICKI & J. LITTERER, supra note 7, at 239.
42. Greenhalgh, Changing Behavior Through Performance Appraisal, in THE
MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR AND DISPUTE RESOLVER 132-33 (1985).
43. French & Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER
150-67 (D. Cartwright ed. 1959). See Greenhalgh, supra note 42, at 133.
44. R. LEWICKI & J. LITTERER, supra note 7, at 247.
45. Greenhalgh, supra note 42, at 133.
46. R. LEWICKI & J. LITTERER, supra note 7, at 252.
47. Greenhalgh, supra note 42, at 134.
48. R. LEWICKI & J. LiTTERER, supra note 7, at 251.
49. Greenhalgh, supra note 42, at 134.
50. R. LEWICKI & J. LITTERER, supra note 7, at 244.
51. Greenhalgh, supra note 42, at 134-35.
7
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when a person complies with the requests of the powerholder.51 One problem
with the use of reward power, in addition to the surveillance problem that
exists when punishment power is used, is that rewards must increase over
time in order to satisfy the person being influenced. As a result, reward power
can be costly."
The relationship between law, or at least litigation, and the five bases of
power is subject to speculation. It appears that law is more closely related to
legitimate power, expert power, and punishment power than to the other
power bases. Law represents legitimate power to the extent it is accepted and
obeyed by those it affects. Attorneys within and outside a company can exert
expert power so long as their expertise is respected. As the legal education of
managers increases, however, law becomes demystified and the power balance
shifts from attorneys to management. Punishment power relates to the ability
of a company to exercise legal rights in punishing employees, such as the right
to fire an employee "at will."
Although the development of a more precise model of the relationship
between law and power is a fertile area for future research, it is clear for the
time being that the bases of power are complex and go beyond the law. A
company (or an individual) that, in its failure to recognize this complexity,
tends to equate law with power will encounter inevitable problems. These po-
tential problems include the heavy transactions costs associated with litigation
and the possibility that a change in the law might shift the corporate power
structure.
Changes in the employment-at-will rule, for example, have been expensive
for companies relying on the traditional approach," which typically has in-
volved the use of punishment power to fire an employee. If, instead of relying
on law-backed punishment power, a manager is sensitive to other bases of
power, litigation might be avoided. An employee under review often possesses
certain types of power, such as expert power (knowledge of lower-level opera-
tions) and reward power (ability to make the manager look good) that should
be recognized by the superior.5" If a manager is insensitive to the subordinate's
power and relies too heavily on legitimate or punishment power, the
subordinate might become hostile, leading to escalation of the dispute. Escala-
tion, in turn, might result in dismissal of the employee and litigation."
If, on the other hand, the dynamics of power are recognized in the early
stages of negotiation between the manager and subordinate, it is likely that the
parties will be in a better position to address and resolve the substantive
52. R. LEWICKI & J. LITTERER, supra note 7, at 243.
53. Greenhalgh, supra note 42, at 134.
54. A 1982 study of California wrongful discharge cases that went to juries re-
vealed that plaintiffs were successful in ninety percent of the cases and the average
award was $450,000. See Lopatka, supra note 35, at 3.
55. See, e.g., Greenhalgh, supra note 42, at 140-41.
56. Id. at 132.
[Vol. 1988
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problems that are at issue. In other words, power theory focuses more on
preventing the conception of a dispute than on the later point in time when the
dispute escalates and hostilities surface.
B. Alternative Dispute Resolution
1. The Law School Approach: Alternatives to Litigation
Law school teaching and .research on dispute resolution places great em-
phasis on alternatives to litigation."' Although there is some disagreement re-
garding the classification of the alternatives," they usually fall within two
widely-known models of dispute resolution:5" arbitration and mediation. Most
alternatives, however, do not precisely match these two prototypes" and some
methods, labeled "hybrid processes" in the discussion that follows, are espe-
cially difficult to categorize.
Mediation and arbitration will be defined below in terms of control, which
is considered "the most significant factor in characterizing a procedural sys-
tem."" The two key control variables are control over the decision ("the de-
gree to which any one of the participants may unilaterally determine the out-
come of the dispute")' and control over the process ("the development and
selection of information that will constitute the basis for resolving the
dispute")."
a. The arbitration model, which is similar to adjudication," calls for the
57. See U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 4.
58. See, e.g., the classifications in CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, supra note
21, at MH 16-17; U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 34; S. GOLDBERG, E.
GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 8; J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P. SZANTON, Dis-
PUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA: PROCESSES IN EVOLUTION 42-50 (1984).
59. U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 12.
60. "We usefully distinguish pure types like adjudication and mediation, but in-
stitutions usually do not operate in accordance with a single prototype. In practice
these types are combined, and much dispute processing deviates from the avowed pro-
totype." Id. at 30.
61. Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 546
(1978). See also THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 89 (J. Lieberman ed.
1984); Sheppard, Third Party Conflict Intervention: A Procedural Framework, 6 RES.
IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 141, 150 (1984). Other common denominators of alterna-
tive dispute resolution techniques are: retranslation of the problem from legal issues to
the real issues, patent responsiveness to each party, access to third parties, and analysis
of incentives to resolve disputes. CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, supra note 21, at
xxvii-xxviii.
62. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 61, at 546.
63. Id.
64. ROLE OF COURTS, supra note 61, at 95. See also Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 392 (1978); J. HENRY & J. LIEBER-
MAN, supra note 8, at 69.
1988]
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parties to control the process (in that they present proofs and arguments) but
not the decision, which is rendered by a third party." Parties may agree in
advance of a dispute to arbitration in forty-three states" or may consent after
a dispute has arisen. 7 And, as discussed later, the state may require certain
cases to be submitted to arbitration." Among the advantages that arbitration
offers"' are: speed, privacy, the use of an expert as arbitrator, flexibility in
procedure and remedies, and cost savings.70
Arbitration affords the opportunity for parties to utilize creative proce-
dures such as a "high-low" contract.71 Under the "high-low" arrangement,
which may also be used in litigation, the parties agree in advance on the pa-
rameters of the plaintiff's recovery. The agreement in a product liability action
for $400,000 might provide, for example, that if the jury decides that the de-
fendant is not liable, the defendant will still pay $50,000, while if the defend-
ant is liable, the defendant will pay $100,000. Through the agreement, the
defendant has avoided the risk of substantial damages ($400,000) while the
plaintiff is protected from the possibility of no recovery. 7'
Arbitration also may be used in conjunction with the court system. For
instance, the use of private judges as referees is permitted by all states except
Illinois and Louisiana."s Labeled "rent-a-judge" by the press,74 this procedure
offers several advantages of standard arbitration-notably speed, privacy, the
ability to select an expert as arbitrator, and lower costs. The two major differ-
65. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 8; ROLE OF COURTS,
supra note 61, at 89.
66. Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.B.A. J. 78, 79 (1985).
67. ROLE OF COURTS, supra note 61, at 95.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 99-103.
69. U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 12-13. These advantages, of
course, do not apply to every situation. For example, in some cases arbitration may
take as long as litigation. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 71-72.
70. For an example of cost savings, see CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, supra
note 21, at 338-39.
71. Other creative approaches include final-offer arbitration and one-way arbi-
tration. With final-offer arbitration, the parties first make final offers, and then the
arbitrator (without seeing the offers) makes an award. The actual award will be the
final offer that is closer to the arbitrator's award. This procedure offers an inducement
to the parties to make reasonable final offers. If the plaintiff, for instance, makes a
reasonable offer that is closer to the arbitrator's award than the defendant's offer, the
plaintiff will receive the amount of its offer. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER,
supra note 2, at 282.
With one-way arbitration, only one party, typically the more powerful party,
agrees to be bound by the arbitration. J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P. SZANTON, supra
note 58, at 47. For an example of the one-way arbitration procedure used by Ford
Motor Co. see CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, supra note 21, at 219-28.
72. S. GOLDBERG. E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 281-82.
73. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 75.
74. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 6, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
[Vol. 1988
10
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1988, Iss.  [1988], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1988/iss/6
ANALYTIC MODELING
ences are that the rules of evidence apply to the proceeding75 and the referee's
decision may be appealed on the basis of an error of law.7 6 The use of private
judges has been subject to criticism for providing "rich man's justice" because
the referee is paid for by the litigants.
7 7
b. The mediation model calls for the involvement of a third-party media-
tor who attempts to assist parties in resolving a dispute but who has no power
to render a decision.7 8 Thus, as in negotiation without a third party, the parties
who participate in mediation have control over both the process and the deci-
sion. 79 Among the advantages cited for mediation are the opportunity to deal
with issues underlying a dispute, the avoidance of bitterness following a dis-
pute by allowing the disputants to build understanding and trust, and cost
savings."
The mini-trial represents an especially promising form of mediation. De-
spite its name, the mini-trial is not a trial but, instead, an information ex-
change which allows business executives to hear attorneys for both sides pre-
sent their best case in abbreviated form. Following the presentation, the
executives meet in an attempt to resolve the dispute in a business-like man-
ner.s' Although model agreements have been developed, s2 there is no one set
procedure. For example, a mini-trial may utilize a neutral advisor, although
one is not required,"s and may take place with or without court supervision."
The original mini-trial was held in 1977, in an attempt to resolve a patent
dispute between Telecredit, Inc. and TRW, Inc. In 1974, Telecredit sued
TRW for patent infringement, seeking an injunction and $6 million in dam-
ages. By 1977, 100,000. documents had exchanged hands, but a pretrial con-
ference date had not yet been set. The parties then began to develop a proce-
dure they called an "information exchange.""s This procedure initially called
75. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 75.
76. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 281.
77. CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, supra note 21, at 79.
78. Conciliation is similar to mediation, although in the former the third party
plays a less active role. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HANDLING CUSTOMER COM-
PLAINTS: IN-HOUSE AND THIRD-PARTY STRATEGIES 9 (1980).
79. ROLE OF COURTS, supra note 61, at 96.
80. U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 14.
81. E. FINE, CPR LEGAL PROGRAM MINI-TRIAL WORKBOOK, app. 7 (1985); see
also Comment, Whose Dispute Is This Anyway?: The Propriety of the Mini-Trial in
Promoting Corporate Dispute Resolution, 1987 Mo. J. DIsP. RES. 133.
82. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 129-37.
83. Id. at 32. TRW used a minitrial without a neutral advisor in resolving a
dispute with NASA. How To KEEP YOUR COMPANY OUT OF COURT 48 (P. Allen ed.
1984).
84. E. FINE, supra note 81, at 56.
85. For a description of the procedure chosen by the three parties involved in the
Telecredit-TRW mini-trial, see Green, Marks & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation:
An Alternative Approach, 11 Loy L.A.L. REV. 493 (1978). See also Text of TRW-
1988]
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for expedited discovery, which would last six weeks. Following discovery, a
two-day meeting was scheduled. At the meeting, the attorneys for each side
were given four hours to present their best case, followed by short periods for
reply and rebuttal. The proceedings were moderated by a neutral advisor (a
patent law expert), who was to provide a nonbinding opinion if the parties
failed to settle the case." The executives in attendance (the president of
Telecredit and vice-president of TRW), who had authority to settle, met for
thirty minutes following the presentations. and reached a settlement agree-
ment, thus saving an estimated $1 million in attorneys' fees." In the years
following the TRW-Telecredit precedent, mini-trials have been used in more
than one hundred cases."
One of the major advantages of the mini-trial is that executives, having
heard the best case presentation of the opposing attorney, come to the realiza-
tion that there are two sides to the issues in dispute." The information gained
during the proceeding will enable them to evaluate the litigation as they would
other investments and negotiate a settlement that preserves business relation-
ships." The mini-trial also offers savings in time and money." It is estimated
that the cost of a mini-trial is ten percent of the cost of traditional litigation."
The mini-trial offers executives the opportunity to use creative problem
solving in shaping a "win-win" resolution of the dispute, as opposed to the "all
or nothing" solutions often rendered in litigation.3 However, there are legal
limits to creativity. For example, the executives handling the negotiation, if
they are not already familiar with antitrust law, should be briefed on per se
offenses such as price fixing," tying arrangements, 5 and reciprocal dealings."
Telecredit Mini-Trial Protocol, ALTERNATIVES, Apr. 1984, at 15.
86. For a description of the Telecredit-TRW mini-trial by the neutral advisor,
see Davis, A New Approach to Resolving Costly Litigation, 61 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 482
(1979).
87. A detailed account of the Telecredit-TRW mini-trial is found in J. HENRY &
J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 19-25. See also E. FINE, supra note 81, at 31-33 and
CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, supra note 21, at MH 22-36.
88. Silas, Mini-trials Lauded, 71 A.BA. J. 25 (1985). See, e.g., CENTER FOR
PUBLIC RESOURCES, supra note 21, at MH 26-53; E. FINE, supra note 81, at 34-55.
89. J. HENRY & . LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 9, 31.
90. Id. at 43-44.
91. Id. at 36-39, 46-47.
92. Minitrials to the Rescue? 70 A.BA J. 134 (1984).
93. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 39-42.
94. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
95. See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
96. See F.T.C. v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965). For examples
of other per se offenses that might relate to mini-trial negotiations, see CENTER FOR
PUBLIC RESOURCES, supra note 21, at MH 76-77. Executives should also understand
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c. Hybrid processes fall somewhere between mediation and arbitration
with regard to the disputants' control over the process and decision.Y Three
prominent examples are the summary jury trial, court-annexed arbitration,
and med-arb.
The summary jury trial is a procedure that utilizes an advisory jury in
order to encourage parties to reach a settlement. Attorneys first present short
(e.g., one hour) summaries of the case to the jury. The jury deliberates for a
short period of time and then answers specific questions about liability and
damages."' Through this procedure, attorneys are presumably better able to
evaluate and settle the case.
The use of court-annexed (or court-ordered) arbitration has been author-
ized by sixteen states and ten federal district courts." Under this procedure,
courts order arbitration in all cases in which the claim for damages falls below
a certain amount, in many states between $10,000 and $15,000. w A party
who does not accept the arbitrator's award is entitled to a trial de novo.101
Although evidence from the arbitration is usually not admissible during the
trial,1 " sanctions may be imposed if the party requesting the trial does no
better than in the arbitration. The sanctions, which can include payment of
the costs of both the arbitration and the trial, have been upheld when attacked
on constitutional grounds.'"
Med-arb is a process in which a third party first acts as a mediator and
then, if mediation fails, as an arbitrator. An advantage of this process is that
the parties will be induced to settle the dispute when a mediator-arbitrator
provides hints regarding the likely outcome of an arbitration.104 One variation
of med-arb calls for the third party to act as an advisory arbitrator if media-
tion fails.105 Another variation gives the mediator the power to recommend a
97. J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P. SZANTON, supra note 58, at 44.
98. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 282-83. See also
Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 43 (1980); J.
MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P. SZANTON, supra note 58, at 46.
99. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, COURT-ORDERED ARBI-
TRATION ISSUE 4 (1985).
100. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 225, 228; J.
MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P. SZANTON, supra note 58, at 46.
101. NATIONAL INSTITUTE, supra note 99, at 3.
102. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 225, 230-31. In
states where the findings of an arbitration panel are admissible in court, the procedure
has withstood challenges on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Johnson v. St. Vincent
Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa.
106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
103. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 230. See, e.g., In re
Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955).
104. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 246.
105. See Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances Under a Collective Bargaining
Contract: An Alternative to Arbitration, 77 Nw. UL. REV. 270 (1982).
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decision to an arbitrator.'"
2. The Business School Approach: The Manager as a Dispute Resolver
The business school approach to alternative dispute resolution differs from
the law school perspective in that there is interest in both the inquisitorial
process (in addition to mediation and arbitration) and the manager as a third-
party dispute resolver.
The inquisitorial process receives little coverage in legal publications on
dispute resolution.1°0 In business school research, however, relying heavily
upon the procedural taxonomy developed by Thibaut and Walker,"' the in-
quisitorial (or autocratic) system found in Europe receives more attention. In
the inquisitorial process, court investigators gather evidence on behalf of the
judge, who calls and questions witnesses before reaching a decision.1" The
third party (judge) thus controls both the process and the decision.
The study of managers as third-party dispute resolvers is considered ap-
propriate because conflict intervention is a major part of their jobs.110 A study
by Sheppard 11 of the procedures used by managers in conflict intervention, as
compared with arbitration, mediation, and inquisitorial processes, yielded sur-
prising results. The most common intervention procedure involved manage-
ment control of both the process and the decision-that is, inquisitorial
intervention.11
The second most common procedure, which Sheppard labelled "providing
impetus," '' does not match precisely any of the three processes. The example
given by Sheppard is a dispute between the head of the data processing de-
partment in a retail store chain, who wanted to hire summer interns immedi-
ately, and the person who headed personnel, who argued that normal hiring
practices should be followed."1 In intervening in this dispute, the company
vice president told the managers that they had "damn well better go back and
work it out."11'
106. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 247. See also J.
FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION 277-80 (1984).
107. See, e.g., ROLE OF COURTS, supra note 61, at 98; J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON &
P. SZANTON, supra note 58, at 44, 48.
108. J. THIBAULT & L. WALKER. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975), noted in Sheppard, supra note 61, at 150.
109. See Sheppard, Managers as Inquisitors: Some Lessons from the Law, in
NEGOTIATING IN ORGANIZATIONS 193, 207 (M. Bazerman & R. Lewicki eds. 1983).
110. Id. at 194.
111. Id. at 203.
112. Id.
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The third intervention procedure, called "adversary intervention""' by
Sheppard, is similar to the arbitration model in which a manager controls the
decision but allows the disputants to control the process (the presentation of
evidence and arguments). Notably absent from the procedures used by manag-
ers is the mediation process. In other words, "managers most frequently ap-
pear to utilize one of three procedures which are quite different from those
generally recommended [conciliatory or mediation procedures] in the Organi-
zational Behavior literature."1 '
As Sheppard's study illustrates, alternative dispute resolution offers great
potential for collaborative business and legal research. Business research
would be enriched by comparative law research on the two legal sys-
tems-inquisitorial and adversarial-that strongly parallel two of the three
management intervention procedures.' Existing legal research on the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the two systems, for instance, "suggests at least
five hypotheses that can begin to form the basis of a contingency model of
managerial conflict intervention.""' Furthermore, legal research regarding
modification of the two legal systems to minimize their weaknesses would be
useful in analyzing managerial intervention strategies.'2
Legal research would benefit from closer scrutiny of the processes, such
as managerial conflict intervention, that take place before the conflict is recog-
nized as a legal dispute. A study of the frequency of litigation' 2 ' revealed that
for every 1000 grievances, 718 claims were made to the offending party.'22 Of
these claims, 449 resulted in disputes.' 2 In the 103 of these disputes where
lawyers were retained, actual complaints were filed in 50 cases.12 " A conclu-
sion that might be drawn from this survey is that the lawyer's role as the
116. Id. at 205.
117. Sheppard, supra note 61, at 162.
118. Sheppard, supra note 109, at 208.
119. Id. at 208-209. These hypotheses are:
First, adversary intervention will be perceived by the disputing employees
as more fair than inquisitorial interventions .... [Secondj more information
relevant to the task of the intervening manager will be generated using adver-
sary intervention than will be generated using inquisitorial intervention. ...
[Third,] managers using adversary intervention will be less likely to become
prematurely biased and draw premature conclusions than will managers using
inquisitorial intervention.... [Fourth,] inquisitorial intervention will generate
less distorted or biased information than adversary information will. ...
[Fifth,] inquisitorial intervention will result in less conflict during the resolu-
tion process than will adversary intervention.
Id.
120. Id. at 209-10.
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"gatekeeper for disputes"'' is greatly overblown in that only 10.3 percent of
the grievances reached an attorney.
This conclusion means that the role of non-professional dispute resolvers,
such as managers, is more important than may have been assumed by legal
researchers. Indeed, dispute resolution by managers might be described as pri-
mary dispute resolution rather than alternative dispute resolution because
most individuals with grievances (89.7 percent) apparently do not consider the
legal system as an option to which processes such as managerial intervention
might be seen as alternatives. Legal researchers who are conversant with busi-
ness research will be challenged to develop new processes aimed at fair resolu-
tion of the great majority of disputes that never reach the legal system.
C. Dispute Management
Models of dispute management are based on two assumptions. First, it is
assumed that litigation can be managed using the tools of cost accounting and
business judgment. Second, the work of the law department, like other corpo-
rate departments, is viewed as a center for the management of investments."
To accomplish successful dispute management, managers must be educated-
about litigation,12 7 and corporate attorneys must be knowledgeable about
budgetary systems.
In 1976, for example, Xerox Corporation decided that a system of budg-
etary planning was necessary to control legal expenses." Xerox realized that
the timing of litigation expenses is an important factor, for a company must be
aware of projected cash flows."' Staff lawyers at Xerox initially argued that it
was not possible to use a budgetary system for litigation because of uncertain-
ties relating to actions by adversaries and judges.'8 0 However, Xerox pro-
ceeded to develop its budgetary system on the realization that "recognizing the
existence of unknown factors, and estimating their impact, is hardly unheard
of in financial planning.""' The results at Xerox are noteworthy. Between
1976 and 1982, Xerox reduced outside legal expenses from $12 million to $3
million and its law department staff from 152 to 70 lawyers.'
125. See supra text accompanying note 15. As Prof. McKay has observed, "dis-
putants do not see the issue as courts or something else. They want resolution of their
dispute by whatever device is most likely to be fair, speedy and inexpensive." ADR
Book Review, ALTERNATIVES, Oct. 1985, at 15 (emphasis in original).
126. CENTER FOR PUBLIC RSOURCE, supra note 21, at xxviii.
127. Id. at 64.
128. Id. at 312.
129. Id.
130. Banks, Companies Struggle to Control Legal Costs, HARV. Bus. REv.,
Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 169.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 168. Other factors, however, may account in part for the reduction in
expenses and staff. For instance, in 1976 Xerox Corp. "was in the throes of major
[Vol. 1988
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It is ironic that dispute management, which perhaps holds the most prom-
ise of any dispute resolution strategy for joint business and legal research, has
been ignored for the most part by researchers in law and business schools. The
small amount of research on dispute management tends to be conducted by
practitioners for practicing attorneys or managers.183 This is an area of re-
search which obviously has great future potential and should be explored.
III. DECISION TREE ANALYSIS
In the preceding section, a three-part dispute resolution taxonomy was
used to provide an overview of the relationship, in theory, between law school
alternative dispute resolution concepts and the business school interest in
power theory and conflict management. Several topics which hold special
promise for collaborative research were also noted. In this section, a specific
technique that illustrates the benefits that might arise from joint legal and
business research-decision tree analysis-is examined in greater detail.
One major theme underlying business and legal research in dispute reso-
lution is the importance of management involvement in preventing and resolv-
ing disputes and in managing litigation. However, increased management in-
volvement is problematic in that executives frequently have difficulty
incorporating legal analysis, with its inherent complexity and uncertainty, into
management decision making. Decision tree analysis offers a solution to this
problem and, by so doing, allows executives to become more effective partici-
pants in dispute resolution processes.
Decision tree analysis has been used for many years in making business
decisions under conditions of uncertainty.
Personalized decision analysis has become an accepted part of the staff ser-
vices that major corporations draw on routinely, much as they do industrial
psychology, cost analysis, marketing research, and economic analysis. And
virtually all the major areas of government have adopted decision analysis in
one form or another.'"
The use of decision trees cuts across the business spectrum,1 as applications
litigation." CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, supra note 21, at 312. Settlement of such
litigation would presumably reduce the need for legal services.
133. See, e.g., Allen, How to be a Smart Consumer of Legal Services: Control-
ling Legal Fees and Lawyers, in How TO KEEP YOUR COMPANY OUT OF COURT,
supra note 83, at 23-40; J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 96-98, 147-53;
Chayes, Greenwald & Wing, Managing Your Lawyers, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb.
1983, at 84; Quinn, Preparing the Litigation Budget, ALTERNATIVES, Feb. 1983, at 1;
Warshauer, Litigation Management Techniques, ALTERNATIVES, Nov. 1984, at 7.
134. Ulvila & Brown, Decision Analysis Comes of Age, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-
Oct. 1982, at 131. See also M. PETERSON, NEW TooLs FOR REDUCING CIVIL LITIGA-
TON EXPENSES 25 (1983); Fisher, He Who Pays the Piper, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-
Apr. 1985, at 158.
135. See CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS OF MODERN DECISION MODELS (V.
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have been developed in accounting, 136 economics, 1 7 finance,'" marketing, 8"
organizational behavior,1' 0 and corporate strategy."' Decision tree analysis
has also been used in medical decision making.' 4
Corporate counsel began to recognize the benefits of decision tree analysis
in the early 1980's and today references to this method of analysis for making
legal decisions appear in law school textbooks1 4 3 and other books.1 4 4 However,
apart from a few, short articles in journals oriented toward practitioners,"'"
decision tree analysis has been virtually ignored to date in academic journals.
In this section, the use of decision tree analysis in building a model of a
litigation decision will be described using a hypothetical case for illustrative
purposes. The model will then be used in making several management deci-
sions relating to litigation. The section will close with a review of the extent to
which decision trees are currently used in corporate practice.
Tummala & R. Henshaw eds. 1976).
136. See, e.g., R. ANTHONY & J. REECE, ACCOUNTING: TEXT AND CAsES 726-28
(1983).
137. See P. MARSHALL, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS: TEXT AND CASES 245-51
(1973).
138. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINICPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 204-13
(1981).
139. See W. O'DELL, A. RUPPEL & R. TRENT, MARKETING DECISION MAKING:
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK AND CASES 96-100 (1976).
140. See Hatvany, Decision Making: Managers and Cognitive Models, in MAN-
AGING ORGANIZATIONS (D. Nadler, M. Tushman & N. Hatvany eds. 1982).
141. See Duncan, What is the Right Organizational Structure? Decision Tree
Analysis Provides the Answer, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Winter 1979, at 59.
142. See, e.g., S. BARNOON & H. WOLFE, MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
MEDICAL DECISIONS (1972); P. HILL, H. BEDEAU, R. CHECHILE, W. CROCHETIERE, B.
KELLERMAN. D. DUNJIAN, S. G. PAUKER, S. P. PAUKER & J. RUBIN, MAKING DECI-
SIONS 152-76 (1979) [hereinafter P. HILL].
143. See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 549; R. GIL-
SON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 86-99 (1986).
144. See J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 98-99; R. BEHN & J.
VAUPEL, QUICK ANALYSIS FOR BUSY DECISION MAKERS 133-62, 234-70 (1982); H.
RAIFFA, THE ART & SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 66-77 (1982); M. PETERSON, supra
note 134, at 25-28.
145. See, e.g., Beron, Litigation Analysis: A Comprehensive, Logical Approach
to Litigation Decision-Making, SAN FRAN. ATT'Y, Aug.-Sept. 1984, at 1; Bodily, When
Should You Go to Court, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1981, at 103; Greenberg, The
Lawyer's Use of Quantitative Analysis in Settlement Negotiations, 38 Bus. LAW. 1557
(1983); James, Decision Tree Analysis of Lawsuits, PREY. LAW REP., Apr. 1984, at
150; Raker, Calculating Litigation Prospects, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 14, 1986, at 19, col. 4;
Siedel, The Decision Tree: A Method to Figure Litigation Risks, 11 BAR LEADER,
Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 18; Victor, The Proper Use of Decision Analysis to Assist Litiga-
tion Strategy, 40 Bus. LAW. 617 (1985).
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A. Building a Model of a Litigation Decision
Decision analysis, a term coined in 1963,1" is defined as "a discipline
comprising the philosophy, theory, methodology, and professional practice nec-
essary to formalize the analysis of important decisions."1 7 The decision tree is
a decision analysis technique for dealing with the uncertainty that is inherent
in most difficult decisions. 1' "Decision tree analysis" refers to the use of the
decision tree technique in analyzing a problem.
The use of a decision tree to build a model of a litigation decision is a
three-step process. First, the decision is depicted in the form of a tree on its
side. Next, probabilities are assigned to each of the uncertain events on the
decision tree. Finally, values are specified at the end of the tree's branches.
1. The Decision Tree
An intellectual property case will be used to illustrate the development
and use of a decision tree model. The plaintiff in the case, Alpha, Inc., pro-
duces software that runs on IBM computers. Alpha is now adapting the
software for use on non-IBM equipment, and will be in a position to market
the new product in about a year. The defendant, Beta, Inc., purchased Alpha's
software two years ago and signed a licensing agreement prohibiting the sale
of the software to others. Alpha alleges that Beta is now working on a transla-
tion of Alpha's software for use on non-IBM equipment and asks the court for
an injunction that would prevent Beta from marketing the translation.
Beta has made a final settlement offer to Alpha in which Beta would pay
$1.5 million in cash and, in return, would receive Alpha's permission to con-
tinue with its development and marketing of the translation. Alpha estimates
that if the injunction is issued, the present value 149 of its returns from the
adapted software will be $5.3 million greater than without the injunction. Ex-
penses and fees paid to outside counsel total $75,000 to date, and, if Alpha
proceeds with discovery and a trial, it expects to expend another
$100,000-the present value of future legal fees and costs.
146. READINGS ON THE PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS OF DECISION ANALYSIS
vii (R. Howard & J. Matheson eds. 1983).
147. Id. at viii. Decision analysis has also been categorized as "a discipline for
[the] systematic evaluation of alternative actions [which serves] as a basis for choice
among them." R. BROWN, A. KAHR & C. PETERSON, DECISION ANALYSIS, AN OVER-
VIEW vii (1974).
148. READINGS, supra note 146, at viii. The classic reference on decision analysis
is H. RAiFFA. DECISION ANALYSIS (1970). For a concise introduction to the topic see R.
BROWN, A. KAHR & C. PETERSON, supra note 147; see also P. HILL, supra note 142;
R. BEHN & J. VAUPEL, supra note 144. For an introduction to descriptive decision
making, see G. WRIGHT, BEHAVORIAL DECISION THEORY (1984).
149. See Greenberg, supra note 145, at 1559-61; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 96, at
19881
19
Siedel: Siedel: Intersections of Business and Legal Dispute Resolution:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The president of Alpha wants to take an active role in reaching a settle-
ment decision and in managing the litigation (for example, by making budget-
ing decisions) should the case proceed to trial. The president asks counsel for
an analysis of the legal issues in the case and Alpha's chances for success.
Counsel responds with a memorandum which observes that Alpha's action is
based upon Beta's copyright infringement and misappropriation of Alpha's
trade secrets. The memorandum then describes the key legal issues as follows
(as quoted from the memorandum):
a. Similarity. In order to win on either the copyright infringement or the
trade secrets theory, we must prove that the Beta software is substantially
similar to our software. This is a difficult issue to resolve; we must hire several
experts and take a number of depositions before we know better whether or
not similarity exists. However, the chances are better than even that we will
be able to prove substantial similarity in court.
b. Access. In order to win on either theory we must also prove that Beta had
access to our software before developing its own software. Beta claims that its
software was in the development stage before it purchased our software. Al-
though there is evidence to support Beta's claim, we have concluded that ac-
cess to our software was essential in completing the Beta software and that it
is likely we will be able to prove prior access in court.
c. Validity of Copyright. Beta claims that our copyright is invalid on the
grounds that our program cannot be separated from the idea (the algorithm)
it implements and ideas cannot be copyrighted. Because this claim has little
or no merit, there is a high probability that the court will hold that our copy-
right is valid (which means that we win the case and an injunction will be
issued).
d. Preemption. Even if the court decides that our copyright is invalid, we
might still prevail on a trade secrets theory. There are really two trade secrets
issues which the court must decide. First, the court must determine whether
or not federal copyright law preempts state trade secrets law. We have deter-
mined that the probability of the court deciding that copyright law does not
preempt state trade secrets law (and therefore that we may proceed with our
trade secrets argument) is very high.
e. Trade Secrets Violation. The second trade secrets issue is whether Beta has
misappropriated our trade secrets. It is likely that we will prevail on this
issue.
Making decisions based on this legal analysis is difficult for the president
because the case is complicated and there are several uncertainties. The presi-
dent, therefore, decides to create a decision tree representation of the problem.
Two key elements in a decision tree are the decision fork, represented by a
box, and the chance fork, represented by a circle. Decision forks represent
alternatives over which the president has control, while chance forks represent
uncertain events beyond the decision maker's control. The specific alternatives
and uncertain events are represented by branches emanating from the forks.
To date, decision tree models of litigation decisions have appeared in two
forms. In one form, all issues in the case are combined in one chance fork with
[Vol. 1988
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two branches: "win case" and "lose case," as in Figure 1.1*0
Win case
Figure 1.
In the other, more sophisticated form, each legal issue is specified within the
tree.151 Because the decision tree loses its utility as a powerful analytical tool
when the simple form is used, we will assume that the president selects the
sophisticated form. Figure 2 represents an illustration of one such sophisti-
cated form.
In preparing the decision tree, the president realizes that there is one de-
cision to be made at this time: Should Alpha accept the settlement offer or
continue with the litigation? This decision fork is represented by the box on
the left side of the decision tree in Figure 2. There are five uncontrollable
events, the five issues discussed in the memorandum from counsel, and these
are represented on the tree as chance forks. The issues central to both the
copyright validity and trade secrets issues--similarity and access-are repre-
sented as the first two uncertainties on the tree in Figure 2.
150. See Victor, supra note 145, at 617, 627. For examples of the simple form,
see R. BEHN & J. VAUPEL, supra note 144, at 134; Bodily, supra note 145, at 108;
Greenberg, supra note 145, at 1557; M. PETERSON, supra note 134, at 26; H. RAIFFA,
supra note 144, at 72.
151. See, e.g., Beron, supra note 145, at 7; James, supra note 145, at 153;
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2. Assignment of Probabilities
The next step in building the model of a litigation decision is to assign
probabilities at each of the chance forks. The assignment of probabilities is
part of the everyday work of attorneys"' and Alpha's attorney has already
assigned probabilities in the action against Beta. The problem, however, is that
the attorney's assessment is stated verbally, not in numbers.
Various studies have shown that verbal probability statements mean dif-
ferent things to different people.""' For example, the attorney's memorandum
152. See R. EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILITY 4 (1978); G. WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 96, at 115-19; PLI. PRODUCT LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS 733
(1979). Eggleston notes:
When the legal advisers of a party advise a settlement, they must of
course form some sort of judgment as to the probability of success in the
action, and indeed the decision whether or not to settle involves all the ele-
ments of a betting transaction. One must estimate the chances of success,
what it will cost the client if he loses, and what he is likely to gain if he wins.
EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE at 4.
153. See, e.g., R. BEHN & J. VAUPEL, supra note 144, at 75-78; Beyth-Marom,
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indicates that "there is a high probability that the court will hold our copy-
right valid." What does "high probability" mean? In one study some people
interpreted this as a 40 percent chance, others as a 98 percent chance, with a
median of 85 percent.'" If the attorney means 40 percent when using the
words "high probability" and the executive interprets the words to mean 98
percent, serious miscommunication has occurred which can lead to costly
decisions. 85s
Despite their usefulness in facilitating communication, however, the as-
signment of probability numbers has been criticized on the grounds that law-
yers are not trained in providing probability estimates.'" A strong argument
can be made that such criticism is unjustified because estimating probabilities
is at the heart of legal education and law practice.8 7 And, even if there is
some validity to the criticism, techniques are available to assist the attorney in
probability assessment.
One tool used by decision analysts to assess probabilities is the decision
wheel, which has been described as follows:
[A decision wheel] is a two-color wheel where the relative amount of each
color can be varied (from 0% blue/100% orange to 100% blue/0% orange).
Counsel then adjusts the two colors until they are in the same relative propor-
tion as the more and less likely legal outcomes are. Use of the wheel is very
important because a visual representation makes people think harder before
answering a question, and because most people have a very imperfect idea of
probabilities: 80 and 90 percent seem similar until one sees that 80% is 4 to 1
odds and 90% is 9 to I odds.'"
Other techniques might include some of the alternative dispute resolution
methods discussed earlier in this paper. For example, the neutral advisor in a
How Probable is Probable? A Numerical Translation of Verbal Probability Expres-
sions, I J. FORECASTING 257 (1982); Lichtenstein & Newman, Empirical Scaling of
Common Verbal Phrases Associated with Numerical Probabilities, 9 PSYCHOLOGY
Sci. 563 (1967).
154. R. BEHN & J. VAUPEL, supra note 144, at 76.
155. Misinterpretation of the word "fair," for instance, may have led to the Bay
of Pigs fiasco. Id. at 77. Interpretation of local sayings is a special problem. Some
Texas lawyers use the expression "[t]hat dog won't hunt," which is interpreted to mean
less than a 25 percent chance. Victor, supra note 145, at 625.
156. See, e.g., M. PETERSON, supra note 134, at 16; Gonser, Soma & Wilhelm,
The Computer as a Tool for Legal Decision Making, PRAC. LAW., Sept. 1981, at 12.
For a general introduction to the subjective interpretation of probability, see R. WIN-
KLER, INTRODUCTION TO BAYESIAN INFERENCE AND DECISION 15-18 (1972).
157. "I wish, if I can, to lay down some first principles for the study of this body
of dogma or systematized prediction which we call the law, for men who want to use it
as the instrument of their business to enable them to prophesy in their turn.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
158. M. Victor, Litigation Risk Analysis 5 (Nov. 4, 1982) (unpublished manu-
script). See also Spetzler & Stael von Holstein, Probability Encoding in Decision
Analysis, 22 MGMT. Sci. 340, 348-50 (1975).
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mini-trial might be asked to give an opinion of the strong and weak points of
each party's case and the probable trial result.15'
Regardless of the specific technique selected, probability assessment pro-
vides counsel with the opportunity to formalize the process of analyzing argu-
ments on both sides of each issue."" This process is especially important be-
cause, as shown by studies conducted by Kahneman and Tversky, 1 '1
individuals tend to make estimates by starting with an initial value (the
"anchor") and then making adjustments in order to reach a conclusion.,
However, adjustments are usually insufficient, which results in bias toward the
initial value.1 6 3
The attorney for Alpha, after a careful probability assessment, translates
the verbal probability statements into the following numbers:
a. Similarity ("better than even") = 60 percent
b. Access ("it is likely") = 70 percent
c. Validity of Copyright ("high probability") = 80 percent
d. Preemption ("very high probability") = 90 percent
e. Trade Secrets Violation ("it is likely") = 70 percent
These probabilities are noted at the chance forks on the decision tree in Figure
3.
3. Endpoint Values
As the final step in building a litigation decision model, values are noted
at the end of each of the decision tree branches. The endpoint value for the
"settle" branch, as noted in Figure 3, is the $1.5 million settlement offer made
by Beta.
The calculation of the other branch endpoint values is more complicated.
The president has determined that the present value1 of the injunction is
$5.3 million. The president deducts from this amount the present value of fu-
ture legal fees and costs, $100,000. The sunk costs of $75,000 are not taken
into account. However, another expense has been overlooked by the president
159. See supra text accompanying note 86 and infra note 169. For examples of
mini-trials in which neutral advisors have served this function, see Taylor, Fine &
Moukand, CPR Working Taxonomy of Alternative Legal Processes, ALTERNATIVES,
May 1983, at 14. Other alternative dispute resolution methods that might be used in
probability assessment are med-arb and court-annexed arbitration. See supra text ac-
companying notes 99-106.
160. Victor, supra note 145, at 619, 621.
161. Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bi-
ases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1128-29 (1974). See also JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982).
162. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 161.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 149.
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and counsel'"--the cost of management involvement in litigation. This cost,
although difficult to quantify,'" represents the largest litigation expense.16
For example, studies indicate that the "disruption factor" in a patent infringe-
ment case can translate into hundreds of thousands of dollars in lost market
share. ' " We will assume that Alpha analyzes the extent of management in-
volvement and determines its cost to be $200,000 (present value). When this
amount is deducted, along with future legal fees and costs, from $5.3 million,
Alpha will net $5 million if it wins the case. This amount is specified at the
end of the two "win" branches in Figure 3. If Beta prevails in the case, Alpha
will lose $300,000, the combined legal and management costs. This figure has
been noted at the end of each of the "lose" branches in Figure 3.
165. The failure of executives to consider the cost of management involvement
might be attributed to the fact that the decisions in disputes are usually "framed" by
attorneys, who often fail to take into account such considerations. "The same decision
can be framed in several different ways; different frames can lead to different deci-
sions." Kahneman & Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, 246 Scl. AM. 160, 166
(1982). Although the theory has not yet been researched, one would suspect that fram-
ing the issues in a dispute as business, rather than legal, would improve the chances of
successfully resolving that dispute, without resorting to litigation. See also infra note
189.
166. In his 1982 report on the state of the judiciary, Former Chief Justice War-
ren E. Burger noted:
A common thread pervades all courtroom contests: lawyers are natural
competitors, and once litigation begins they strive mightily to win using every
tactic available. Business executives are also competitors, and when they are
in litigation, they often transfer their normal productive and constructive
drives into the adversary contest. Commercial litigation takes business execu-
tives and their staffs away from the creative paths of development and pro-
duction and often inflicts more wear and tear on them than the most difficult
business problems.
Burger, Isn't There a Better Way, 68 A.B.A. J. 275 (1982).
167. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 46. See also Gonser & Wil-
helm, supra note 32, at 446.
168. CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, supra note 21, at 338-39.
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Copyright valid
Figure 3
For purposes of this discussion, we assume that the values that have been
noted at the endpoints in Figure 3 were determined by the president in con-
junction with Alpha's finance department. In calculating these values, a fi-
nance department might develop its own decision tree model, with probability
distributions at each chance fork."' Alternatively, depending on the nature of
the litigation, the plaintiff might enter into a high-low contract with the de-
fendant, 170 which would enable the parties to specify with certainty the value
of a win or loss.
B. Use of the Model for Litigation Decisions
Having developed the model of the litigation decision, the president of
Alpha is now ready to use the model in making a settlement decision or, if
settlement fails, in actively managing the litigation or in utilizing alternatives
such as the mini-trial.
169. High, medium and low estimates from a neutral advisor in a mini-trial
might be used to establish the model. See CENTER FOR PUBuc RESOURCES, supra note
21, at MH-27.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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1. The Settlement Decision
The decision tree can be used in three ways which will enable the presi-
dent to reach an informed settlement decision. First, an "expected value" of
the litigation investment can be calculated and compared with the value of the
settlement offer. Second, the decision tree can be used to calculate the overall
probability of success, should the case go to trial. Finally, given time and
money resource constraints, the decision tree will enable the president to make
a rational selection of the particular issues that warrant further research.
The expected value of the litigation is a value determined by calculating
the weighted average of the "continue" option. This calculation is accom-
plished through a process called "folding back" the decision tree.' Moving
from right to left on the tree, weighted averages are calculated for each
chance fork. For example, the weighted average of the trade secrets fork is
$3.41 million, the sum of (.7 x $5 million) and (.3 x - $300,000). The
weighted average at the preemption fork is $3.039 million, the sum of (.1 x -
$300,000) and (.9 x $3.41 million). By folding back the tree, the president
calculates that the litigation has an expected value of $1.761 million, as noted
in Figure 4.
Copyright valid 5M (33.6%)
./
A ccess 4 .61 M Pr n3M (5.3% )
INo violation -300K (2.3%)
conn3e 039M -30 (5.%)




The president at this point might decide to continue with the litigation
because the expected value of the litigation ($1.761 million) exceeds the settle-
ment value ($1.5 million). The president might reason that, if several major
171. See R. BROWN, A. KAHR & C. PETERSON, supra note 147, at 11-15.
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investment decisions-such as the litigation decision-are made over the next
few years, the company will do better by "playing the averages." Other execu-
tives, however, might feel less comfortable with playing the averages, possibly
because of a different risk profile. These executives would probably use the
decision tree to clarify their decision making rather than as the sole basis for
the decision."'
A second use of the decision tree is to calculate the overall probability of
success. The tree shows two paths to success, the copyright validity path and,
if the copyright validity theory fails, the trade secrets path.17 3 The overall
chance for success is calculated by multiplying the "win" probabilities along
these two paths17' and then combining the two figures. As indicated in Figure
4, the chance for success on the copyright validity issue is 33.6 percent (.6 x .7
x .8) while the chance for success on the trade secrets issue is 5.3 percent (.6 x
.7 x .2 x .9 x .7). These two figures are added together to arrive at an overall
probability for success of 39 percent.
The chance for success in a lawsuit is often the first question raised by a
client, but a question that many attorneys are ill-equipped to answer. The rea-
son for this might be attributed in part to the case method used in law schools.
Law school training tends to have a single-issue orientation in which the pros
and cons of each issue in a case are articulated and debated in great detail
with no attempt, at the conclusion of a discussion, to weave together separate
issues and assess the overall chance for success.
As a result, when a client attempts to probe the details of a case, which is
necessary if alternative dispute resolution and litigation management are to be
effective, the attorney's response is often similar to the five-issue analysis
presented by the Alpha attorney. This leads to miscommunication and overes-
timation of the chance for success by the client. When asked to state the over-
all chance for success given the attorney's summary of the issues in the Alpha
case, for example, executives give estimates ranging from 24 to 90 percent,
with a median of 65 percent. 1
Why does the client's estimate of success (median of 65 percent) differ so
172. See infra text accompanying notes 188-93.
173. Delineating a trade secrets path along the copyright validity path would not
aid the analysis because, if the copyright is valid, Alpha will win regardless of the trade
secrets outcome.
174. "There is a theorem in probability theory that tells me that I can find the
probability of any string of branches through the tree simply by multiplying all of the
component probabilities together." R. BROWN, A. KAHR & C. PETERSON, supra note
147, at 25. See also R. WINKLER, supra note 156, at 34.
175. These results are from an in-class experiment conducted in an executive
program in 1986. Similar results were obtained when the experiment was replicated in
an MBA class (range of 24 to 90 percent, with a median of 50 percent) and a law
school class (range of 30 to 90 percent, with a median of 65 percent). The results in the
law school class indicate that communication is a problem between attorneys as well as
between attorneys and clients. See also M. Victor, supra note 158, at 4.
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dramatically from the result (39 percent) when decision tree analysis is used?
Although this is an area ripe for further research, several possible reasons
come to mind. First, the client may be misinterpreting the individual
probability statements (such as "it is likely") made by the attorney, a problem
discussed earlier in this article.?' Second, even if the attorney's verbal state-
ments are translated into numbers, clients might be susceptible to the general
tendency of people to overestimate the probability of conjunctive events. 177 Fi-
nally, again assuming that the verbal statements are translated into numbers,
clients might not understand the theorems of probability. For example, in in-
formal experiments, several individuals have assumed, incorrectly, that the
overall probability of success is calculated by taking the average of the "win"
probabilities for each issue."'
Whatever the reason, a client's optimistic interpretation of an attorney's
analysis might account in part for the popularity of litigation as a mechanism
for resolving disputes. 17 Presumably, a client who knows that the attorney is
predicting an overall chance for success of 39 percent will be less inclined to
commence litigation and more inclined to settle or use alternative dispute reso-
lution than a client who thinks the chances are 65 percent. 1" Economic analy-
sis of the settlement decision tends to focus on differences between the dispu-
tants' estimates of their probabilities for success as a major obstacle
preventing settlement. 1"1 Decision analysis suggests that perhaps the reasons
for failure to settle go deeper-to miscommunication between attorney and
client.
A final example of the use of decision tree analysis in making a settle-
ment decision relates to the allocation of scarce resources. We might assume,
for instance, that attorneys working on the Alpha case disagree on the chances
for success with regard to particular issues. Most of the staff attorneys agree
that the probability of success on the similarity issue is 60 percent and on the
copyright validity issue is 80 percent. However, a few attorneys are more pes-
simistic; they feel that the 60 percent chance on the similarity issue should be
50 percent. They also feel that the 80 percent chance on the copyright validity
issue should be only 60 percent. The attorneys want to do further research in
order to refine the probability assessments for these two issues. The president,
176. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55.
177. "The general tendency to overestimate the probability of conjunctive events
leads to unwarranted optimism in the evaluation of likelihood that a plan will succeed
or that a project will be completed on time." Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 161, at
1129.
178. This method of calculation was used by several law students in the in-class
experiment. See supra note 175.
179. But see Galanter, supra note 13, for an examination of the hyperlexis
syndrome.
180. See, e.g., How to Evaluate Cases for ADR Potential, ALTERNATIVES, Aug.
1984, at 1.
181. R. POSNER. ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 422, 436 (1977).
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however, with an eye on the budget, concludes that there is only time and
money enough for further work on one of the issues. Which issue is more
important?
The decision tree model allows the president to do a sensitivity analysis to
answer this question. In decision analytic terms, the question is this: Will the
decision to continue with the case change if the probabilities are revised down-
ward? Or, stated another way, is the decision sensitive to a downward change
in probabilities?
These questions are answered by revising the probabilities and then recal-
culating the expected value. If the chance for success on the copyright validity
issue is changed from 80 percent to 60 percent, the new expected value of
continuing with the litigation is $1.597 million, which is still greater than the
settlement offer of $1.5 million. Thus, if the executive plays the averages, the
change in probability would not change the decision to continue with the liti-
gation. If the chance for success on the similarity issue is revised from 60
percent to 50 percent, howeibr, the expected value drops to $1.418 million,
which is less than the settlement offer. Consequently, the decision of whether
or not to settle is sensitive to the 10 percent change in the similarity
probability but not to the 20 percent change in the copyright validity
probability.
The ability to use sensitivity analysis to discriminate among issues has
never been more important. Lawyers are trained in law school and law prac-
tice to "leave no stone unturned. 182 Today, however, with liberalized discov-
ery rules'18 and the availability of at least sixty-eight computerized data bases
relating to law,'" attorneys and clients must be able to determine which issues
are more important than others if legal costs are to be contained. In other
words, they must "calculate when certain stones should be left in place, unin-
spected." 1 " Sensitivity analysis provides the methodology that enables this
calculation to be made.
2. Litigation Management
When a case cannot be settled immediately, an executive can use a deci-
sion tree to make certain budgeting decisions relating to litigation. Two exam-
ples- budgeting for expert witness fees and discovery costs-will be given.
Alpha's counsel wants to hire several eminent computer scientists to tes-
tify during the trial regarding the similarity of the Alpha and Beta programs.
Counsel has determined that with their testimony Alpha's chances for success
182. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 13. See also Raker, supra note
145.
183. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN. supra note 8, at 10.
184. Yates, Nearly Everything You Want to Know About Data Bases, 71 A.B.A.
J. 90 (1985).
185. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 17.
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on the similarity issue will improve from 60 percent to 70 percent. The presi-
dent now wants to determine the maximum amount that the company is will-
ing to spend for expert witness fees.
Although in practice budgeting decisions of this nature are almost pure
conjecture for the client,'" the decision tree can be used to reduce the guess-
work. The president has already calculated the expected value of the litigation
without the expert testimony, $1.761 million. The president now must deter-
mine the new expected value when the "win" probability for the similarity
issue is raised from 50 percent to 60 percent, which is $2.105 million. The
difference between the two values, $344,000, is the maximum amount that
should be budgeted for the experts' testimony. That is, if the attorney's analy-
sis is correct, expert testimony will improve the case by no more than the
amount .of $344,000.
The analysis of discovery costs is more difficult. Before trial, counsel
wants to hire several outdide experts to evaluate and compare the Alpha and
Beta programs in order to determine whether they are similar. The attorney
also wants to take the depositions of several Beta employees for the same pur-
pose. What is the maximum amount that should be budgeted for paying the
experts and taking the depositions?
A decision analyst would state the question as follows: If the discovery
process yields "perfect" information-that is, if the .discovery tells Alpha ex-
actly how the court will decide the similarity issue-what is the maximum
value that Alpha should pay for the information?1 87 In answering this ques-
tion, two assumptions are made. First, unlike the testimony of expert wit-
nesses, the discovery process will not alter Alpha's chance for success, which
will remain at 60 percent. Discovery, instead, will simply disclose whether this
particular case is one of the cases that falls within the 60 percent "win" cate-
gory. Second, it is assumed that Beta can also use discovery to obtain the same
information that Alpha acquires through its discovery procedures.
Given these assumptions and perfect information, the president of Alpha
calculates a new expected value. If the perfect information (the perfect predic-
tion of the court's decision on the similarity issue) reveals that the programs
are not similar, Alpha would drop its case and, thus, avoid the loss of
$300,000 in expenses. If the package is similar, Alpha would proceed with the
case. The expected value at the chance fork for similarity is recalculated as
follows to reflect these decisions: (.6 x $3.135 million) (.4 x 0) = $1.881
million. This new expected value is $120,000 larger than the original expected
value ($1.761 million) or, to phrase it in decision analytic terms, the expected
value of perfect information is $120,000. Because perfect information would
improve the expected value by this amount and the information obtained
186. In-class experiments with executives, business students and law students re-
veal that estimates range from zero to nearly the full amount of the potential damage
recovery (in Alpha's case, $5 million).
187. See R. BROWN, A. KAHR & C. PETERSON, supra note 147, at 19-22.
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through discovery is typically less than perfect, the most that Alpha should
pay for discovery costs is $120,000.
3. Attitude Toward Risk
A detailed discussion of the impact of a client's attitude toward risk is
beyond the scope of this paper. Two points regarding risk, however, deserve
mention. First, through the use of a decision tree, a client's attitude toward
risk can be incorporated into litigation decisions. This is accomplished by con-
structing a utility function for the client, replacing the dollar amounts in the
decision tree with values from the function, and folding back the tree to calcu-
late expected utilities.'" A utility function developed for a client as plaintiff
may differ considerably from the function for the same client named as a de-
fendant. The reason for this discrepancy is that a person making choices
among gains (the plaintiff) tends to be risk averse, while a person making
choices among losses (the defendant) tends to be risk seeking.'"
A second important point regarding risk is the realization that it is the
client's risk profile that is to be taken into consideration, not that of the attor-
ney. Beginning with the classic study by Swalm,1" it has been recognized that
a manager's utility function tends to be more closely related to the individual's
attitude toward risk than the company's risk profile. Likewise, it has been as-
sumed that an attorney's attitude toward risk differs considerably from that of
a client.191 Although this issue calls for further research, 1" it is clear for the
time being that, if legal costs are to be contained, clients must educate attor-
neys about corporate goals, values, beliefs, and attitudes toward risk. In sum,
"the lawyer must understand your 'corporate culture.' "93
188. Id. at 47-48.
189. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 165, at 162, 164. "Framing" plays a role
in developing the utility function for a litigation decision. Id. at 166. This same "fram-
ing" might depend on community values. For example, in a conference to determine
whether to appeal an adverse decision, a "Sydney client will ask, 'How much will we
get if we win?' The Melbourne client will ask 'How much will it cost me if we lose?'"
R. EGGLESTON, supra note 152, at 4. See also G. WILLIAMS, supra note 96, at 131.
190. Swalm, Utility Theory-Insights into Risk Taking, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1966, at 123. See also V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRESTEIN, CORPORATE Fi-
NANCE 1174-76 (1979).
191. H. RAIFFA, supra note 144, at 75.
192. Studies completed to date indicate that economic arrangements with attor-
neys can influence the generation of cases. See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER,
supra note 2, at 153. J. Brett & S. Goldberg have developed an especially useful simu-
lation illustrating this point. The simulation, Rapid Printing Co. v. Scott Computers,
Inc., is distributed by the Disputes Processing Research Program at the University of
Wisconsin.
193. See How TO KEEP YOUR COMPANY OUT OF COURT, supra note 83, at 32;
Raker, supra note 145, at 24-25.
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C. Decision Tree Analysis in Practice
Decision tree analysis today is becoming an accepted tool for use in solv-
ing everyday management problems. 1" There is also anecdotal evidence to the
effect that the use of decision tree analysis to make litigation decisions is be-
coming more popular. For example, at least four of the "Big Eight" account-
ing firms use decision tree analysis in providing litigation support services. 196
And a 1982 survey of law department practices indicates that 26 of the 91




In order to obtain more detailed information regarding the use of decision
analysis in practice, the 108 members of the American Corporate Counsel As-
sociation Litigation Committee were surveyed by the author in 1984. Re-
sponses were received from 67 members; of these a little over twenty percent
(14) indicated that they use decision analysis. Most of the users (10) devel-
oped the analysis solely within the law department, without assistance from
other departments or consultants. Major advantages cited, listed in order of
frequency, were:
!. Usefulness of decision trees in structuring problems;
2. Aiding communication with client;
3. Calculation of the overall probability of success;
4. Calculation of settlement values (by "folding back" the decision tree);
5. Discussion of issues using numerical probabilities; and
6. Identification of key issues (that is, sensitivity analysis).
Of the respondents who use decision analysis, most (11) consider it to be
one factor used in decision making, rather than the sole basis for making deci-
sions. Some respondents also use it for purposes other than litigation, including
analysis of mergers and acquisitions, preventive law decisions (for example,
advising the company how to handle toxic wastes for which the company is not
legally responsible), and advising the board of directors on business judgments.
Although none of the respondents indicated that computer programs are
used in the analysis, it is likely that such use will accelerate sharply in the
near future as the computer gains increasing recognition as a tool for legal
analysis and decision making.'" Several microcomputer packages have been
developed in recent years that provide facilities for constructing and using de-
194. See supra note 134.
195. ARTHUR YOUNG, LITIGATION CONSULTING AND SUPPORT SERVICES 2
(1982); COOPERS & LYBRAND, LITIGATION SERVICES 12-14 (undated); letter from An-
drew J. Capelli, National Practice Director, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (Feb. 18,
1986); telephone interview with Jeffrey Kenrich, Price Waterhouse (March 3, 1986).
196. D. James, Survey of Law Department and Board of Directors Prac-
tices-1982 19 (Feb. 4, 1983) (unpublished manuscript).
197. See Gonser, Soma & Wilhelm, supra note 156, at 13.
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cision trees."" One of these products, Arborist, is available with a 96-page
booklet that describes both the package and the use of decision tree analysis in
making litigation decisions.'" Although the software is user friendly and is
being used by large law firms'00 the major benefit in using Arborist is its per-
formance of calculations in major, complex litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper represents a first attempt to provide an overview of linkages
between legal and business approaches to dispute resolution. A specific tech-
nique discussed in greater detail in the paper, decision tree analysis, illustrates
the potential benefits that can arise from increased interaction between those
engaged in legal and business research.
The paper also suggests an agenda of promising dispute resolution re-
search opportunities, including the relationship between law and power,"'
comparative law research on differences between the inquisitorial and adver-
sarial systems, 3 "1 and dispute management.*" The use of decision tree analysis
alone raises a number of dispute resolution research topics, such as the quali-
tative process used in constructing a decision tree,2" assessment of an attor-
ney's probabilities,20 ' framing of the issues," and incorporation of the client's
attitude toward risk into the decision-making process. "07 Research on decision
tree analysis might indicate that it can be used in determining whether a case
has ADR potential' 0 ' and in selecting an appropriate alternative process. The
use of decision tree analysis in areas other than dispute prevention-for exam-
ple, in financial reporting, 00 in assessing business judgments, and in merger
and acquisition decisions-also deserves further research. Finally, the incorpo-
ration of ethics into the analysis is a research topic that touches all other areas
198. Henrion, Software for Decision Analysis: A Review of Riskcalc, Arborist
and Supertree, 12 OR/MS TODAY 24 (1985); Nti, Review of SMLTREE: The All
Purpose Decision Tree Builder, 14 OR/MS TODAY 28 (1987).
199. Arborist Helps Attorneys Plan Lawsuits, INTERACTIONS, Sept. 1985, at 2-3.
200. Blodgett, Decision Trees, 72 A.BA. J. 33 (1986).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 39-56.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 126-33.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 152-61.
206. See supra notes 165, 189.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 188-93.
208. Prof. Eric D. Green suggests that a case has ADR potential when "the two
parties' combined estimates of probability approaches or exceeds 150 percent." How to
Evaluate Cases, supra note 180, at 3.
209. "Management needs to have an understanding of the litigation so they can
talk to lenders, financial analysts, accountants, and stockholders." Warshauer, supra
note 133, at 7
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Institutional support for dispute resolution has increased in recent
years. 11 By pursuing various research opportunities and utilizing institutional
support, researchers in business schools and law schools have an opportunity to
advance dispute resolution teaching and research and, in so doing, to provide a
model illustrating to the corporate world how the law function can interrelate
with other areas' in a manner that meets institutional needs and accom-
Flishes common goals.
210. See P. HILL, supra note 142, at 27-55.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 134-41.
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